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Abstract
This article deals first of all with the most important characteristics, in terms of 
volume and quality, of all of those decisions issued by the Polish competition 
authority that were the basis for vertical consolidation of the Polish electricity 
sector, for which the authority gave unconditional or special approval between 2003 
and 2007. This article also deals to a limited extent with the decision issued by the 
Polish competition authority prohibiting unconditionally the concentration of PGE 
and ENERGA, and which was referred for judicial review. This article attempts 
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to verify the theory that the legal institution of special (exceptional) approval of 
a concentration, in the form in which it is created in Polish merger legislation 
(i.e.  based mostly on the public interest test, but issued by the competition 
authority), is not the best formula for assessing whether there are legitimate 
grounds for consolidation, in particular consolidation of the Polish electricity sector. 
Résumé 
L’article présent les caractéristiques quantitatives et qualitatives de toutes les 
décisions publiées par l’autorité de concurrence polonaise, qui ont constitué la base 
de la consolidation verticale du secteur de l’électricité en Pologne dans les années 
2003 – 2007. L’article discute aussi la décision prise par l’autorité de concurrence 
polonaise, concernant l’interdiction inconditionnelle de la concentration de PGE/
ENERGA. Cette décision a été soumise à la révision judiciaire. L’objectif de cet 
article est de vérifier la théorie selon laquelle l’institution légale de l’autorisation 
spéciale (exceptionnelle), dans la forme donnée par la législation polonaise 
concernant les fusions, i.e. fondée surtout sur le test de l’intérêt public, mais publiée 
par l’autorité de concurrence, n’est pas la meilleure formule pour juger si’il y a une 
base légitime pour la consolidation, notamment la consolidation du secteur de 
l’électricité polonais.
Classifications and key words: Polish electricity sector; concentrations between 
electricity undertakings; vertical consolidation; preventive concentration control; 
special approval. 
I. Introduction 
When Poland entered the 1990s, its electricity sector was completely state-
run, concentrated, and monopolized1. The major elements of the bituminous 
and lignite coal extraction sector, commercial power stations, and electricity 
supplies went into the state-owned organization called the ‘Energy and Lignite 
Coal Community’ (‘Wspólnota Energetyki i Węgla Brunatnego’). This enabled 
the state monopoly on electricity to be exercised. 
During the 1990s the economic reforms brought with them a concerted 
deconcentration of the Polish electricity sector, based on the British model2. 
1 For more see: P. Jasiński, T. Skoczny, G, Yarrow, Konkurencja a regulacja w energetyce, 
Urząd Antymonopolowy, Warszawa 1995, p. 105 ff; J. Popczyk, ‘Od monopolu do rynku’ [in:] 
Elektroenergetyka. Redakcja: P. Jasiński, T. Skoczny, Centrum Europejskie UW, Warszawa 1996, 
p. 235 ff. 
2 Ibidem. See also: K. Bobińska, ‘The Defence of Monopoly as a Determinant of the Process 
of Transformation of State-owned Infrastructure Sectors’, (2008) 1(1) Yearbook of Antitrust 
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The ‘Energy and Lignite Coal Community’ was disbanded. Bituminous and 
lignite coal mining companies and electricity producers (base load power 
stations) were given autonomy. They were separated from the transmission 
and wholesale undertaking ‘Polskie Sieci Elektroenergetyczne’ (PSE) and 
33 local distribution and retail companies named ‘Zakłady Energetyczne’ 
(ZEs); the latter (the PSE and the 33 ZEs) retained their national or regional 
monopolies. Indeed, there was no significant change to their market position 
even after Poland’s EU accession in 2004. However, EU membership did trigger 
the separation of the Transmission System Operator (TSO), which the PSE 
Operator became3, from which wholesale transactions were removed. This also 
included the separation of the Distribution System Operators (DSOs), which 
operated independently from the wholesale and retail companies trading in 
electricity, also separated within the ZEs. Some power stations and the ZEs 
were privatized and became part of foreign energy groups.
The decapitalization of both production assets and transmission and 
distribution networks meant that there was widespread support for measures 
to move away from the fragmentary structure of the Polish energy sector4. 
This was all the more important considering the investment needs in 
the energy sector, rapid economic growth and the resulting demand for 
electricity, the increasingly manifest political agenda of energy companies’ 
special interests and of course Poland’s EU accession. This was to be done 
by first performing horizontal concentrations (mergers) of the ZEs, and then 
vertical (re)consolidation based on the German model. Each consecutive 
government has introduced programmes to transform the electricity sector, 
and made them politically viable. Among these changes there are plans for 
further privatizations in the production of, as well as distribution and trade 
in electricity.
Despite being performed within the state-owned property, all of these 
consolidations required approval from the competition authority created 
in 1990 by the Anti-monopoly Act5 and operating, from 2000 onwards, on 
the basis – firstly – of the CCP Act 2000 (the Act of 15 December 2000 on 
and Regulatory Studies, p. 131 ff; E. Mączyńska, Restrukturyzacja przedsiębiorstw w procesie 
transformacji gospodarki polskiej, Vol. 1, Warszawa 2001; T. Skoczny, ‘The New Polish Energy 
Law (Including Its European Context)’ (1998) 2 Yearbook of Polish European Studies, p. 173 ff.; 
A. Szablewski, Mechanizmy rynkowe w energetyce i telekomunikacji. Monografie, No. 8, INE 
PAN, Warszawa 1996.
3 Currently PSE Operator fulfills the requirements for ownership split-off under the 3rd 
EC energy package.
4 ‘Transformacja systemu elektroenergetycznego’. Prezentacja kluczowych treści Raportu 
Ernst & Young. 31 styczeń 2011, pp. 3, 16. See also: A. Szablewski, The Need for Revaluation 
of the Structural Canon of Electricity Liberalization (published below in this volume of YARS).
5 Consolidated text in Journal of Laws 1999, No 52, item 547 with amendements.
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Protection of Competition and Consumers)6 and – later – of the CCP Act 
2007 (Act of 16 February 2007 on Competition and Consumer Protection)7. 
These statutes formed, among other things, a system of preventive control of 
concentrations between the undertakings, modelled on EU law8. It differed 
from EU law however in that the President of the Competition and Consumer 
Protection Office (Urząd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów; hereafter, 
UOKiK), unlike the European Commission, has the power not only to prohibit 
a concentration or to approve (without or with specific conditions) on the 
basis of a competition test, but also to decide not to prohibit a concentration 
when this is in the public interest (on the basis of the public interest test). The 
UOKiK President repeatedly exercised the option of issuing special approval, 
precisely in the cases of (re)consolidation of the Polish electricity sector that 
occurred between 2006 and 2007.
This present article aims firstly to present the most important characteristics, 
in terms of volume and quality, of all of those decisions issued by the UOKiK 
President that were the basis for vertical consolidation of the Polish electricity 
sector, for which the competition authority gave unconditional or special 
approval between 2003 and 2007. This article also deals to a limited extent with 
the decision issued by the UOKiK President prohibiting unconditionally the 
concentration of PGE and ENERGA9. This decision is not yet legally binding as 
it has been contested before the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection 
(Sąd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów, hereafter SOKiK). This article 
attempts to provide valuable insight into the theory that the legal institution of 
special (exceptional) approval of a concentration, based on the public interest 
test in the form in which it is created in the 2000 CCP Act and 2007 CCP Act, 
but issued by the competition authority, is not the best formula for assessing 
whether there are legitimate grounds for consolidation, such as in particular 
consolidation of the Polish electricity sector. Analyses have shown that the 
same circumstances and arguments can provide the basis for issuing decisions 
giving both special approval and absolute prohibition of concentrations. This 
depends on the appraisal of such circumstances and arguments by the Polish 
competition authority. As the UOKiK President is an authority specializing 
solely in issues relating to the application of the competition test, this gives 
rise to the open question of whether a competition authority should have the 
power to issue decisions based on the public interest test at all.
6 Conslidated text in Journal of Laws 2005, No. 244, item 2080 with amendments.
7 Journal of Laws 2007 No. 50, item 331 with amendmanets.
8 See A. Jurkiewicz, T. Skoczny, ‘Poland’ [in:] Rowley & Baker, The International Mergers 
– Antitrust Process, Vol. III, Chapter 48. Release 21. March 2011.
9 Decision No DDK – 1/2011 of Jauary 13, 2011 – PGE/ENERGA; available at www.uokik.
gov.pl.
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II. Merger law in Poland (preventive control of concentrations)
The UOKiK President assessed the cases analyzed in this article on the 
basis of the CCP Act 2000 (creation of the PGE and TAURON energy groups) 
or the CCP Act 2007 (creation of the ENEA group and takeover by PGE of 
control over the ENERGA energy group). However this is not relevant in any 
way to the scope and findings of this analysis, as both of these statutes have 
the same axiology10, the same objective,11 subjective12, and geographical scope 
of application13, as well as create the same model for preventive control of 
concentrations14. The essence of this model is – firstly – the statutory obligation 
of undertakings, and this of course includes electricity undertakings, to file 
notification of the intention to concentrate15 and refrain from implementing 
10 Article 1(1) of both the CCP Act 2000 and the CCP Act 2007 provide that ‘The Act 
determines conditions for the development and protection of competition as well as the 
principles of protection the interests of undertakings and consumers in the public interest.’
11 Both the Acts are addressed to the economic entities called ‘entrepreneurs’ 
(‘przedsiębiorcy’); as the official translation of these Acts, these entities will be called in 
‘undertakings’ in this article as well. See Article 4(1) of the CCP Act 2007. ‘For the purpose of 
this Act: (1) ‘undertaking’ shall have the same meaning as under the provisions on freedom of 
business activity, as well as: (a) natural and legal person as well as organisational unit without 
legal status, to which the legislation grants legal capacity, organising or rendering services 
of public utility nature, which are not business activity in the meaning of the provisions on 
freedom of business activity, (b) natural person exercising profession on its own behalf and 
account or performing activity in the frame of exercising such profession, (c) natural person 
having a control within the meaning of the subparagraph 4 over at least one undertaking, 
even if not conducting a business activity within the meaning of the provisions on freedom of 
business activity, provided that this person is undertaking further activities subject to a control 
of concentrations referred to in Article 13’.
12 Article 1(1) of both the CCP Act 2000 and the CCP Act 2007 provide that ‘The Act 
regulates principles and measures of counteracting competition restricting practices and 
practices violating collective consumer interests, as well as anti-competitive concentrations of 
undertakings and associations of thereof, where such practices or concentrations cause or may 
cause effects on the territory of the Republic of Poland.’
13 Ibidem.
14 See Artilces 12–23 of the CCP Act 2000 and Articles 13–24 of the CCP Act 2007. 
15 See Article 13(1) of the CCP Act 2007 providing that ‘1. The intention of concentration 
is subject to a notification submitted to the President of the Office in the case where: 1) the 
combined worldwide turnover of undertakings participating in the concentration in the financial 
year preceding the year of the notification exceeds the equivalent of EUR 1 000 000 000, or 
2) the combined turnover of undertakings participating in the concentration in the territory of 
the Republic of Poland in the financial year preceding the year of the notification exceeds the 
equivalent of EUR 50 000 000.’
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a concentration16 of a national dimension, of which concentrations of the EU 
dimension, subject to European Commission review, are the upper limit17. 
Secondly – this model affords the UOKiK President the exclusive power to 
appraise the concentrations of which it receives notification in an anti-monopoly 
procedure and to issue the relevant decisions. The competition authority 
carries out this appraisal first and foremost on the basis of a competition test. 
The only change to this model (one which occurred in 2004 in connection with 
Poland’s EU accession18) was actually a change regarding the competition test. 
As of May 1, 2004 notifications of the intention to concentrate are appraised 
from the point of view of implications for competition on the basis of the 
criterion used to assess whether the intended concentration would significantly 
impede competition in Poland as well. The previous criterion was the market 
dominant position test19. 
As in the system of preventive control of concentration in place within 
EU countries and most other countries, Poland’s competition authority can 
(absolutely) prohibit the concentration resulting in a significant impediment to 
competition, in particular by creation or strengthening of a dominant position 
in the market20 or approve the concentration not resulting in significant 
impediments to competition, in particular by the creation or strengthening 
of a dominant position in the market21. Approval (so-called conditional 
approval) can also be issued when the concentration, upon fulfillment of the 
conditions laid down in the decision and specified as examples in the Act, 
16 See Article 97(1) of the CCP Act 2007 providing that ‘The undertakings whose intention of 
concentration is subject to a notification shall be under obligation to refrain from implementing 
the concentration until the issuance of the decision by the President of the Office or the lapse 
of the time limit in which such a decision should be issued.’ 
17 The EU dimension of concentration is defined in Article 1 of the Council Regulation 
(EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, 
OJ [2004] L 24/1; it replaced the Council Regulation (EC) 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on 
the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ [1990] L 395/1.
18 See CCP (Amendment) Act 2000 of 2004, April 24 (Journal of Laws 2004 No. 93, item 
891); for more see: T. Skoczny [in:] Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsuemntów. Komentarz. 
Pod redakcją T. Skocznego, C.H. Beck, Warszawa 2009, p. 756-757. 753 ff, 839 ff.
19 According to Article 17 CCP Act 2000 (till 1.5.2004) the UOKiK President could approve 
an intended concentration when it does not create or strengthen a dominant position as a result 
of which competition on the market would be impeded.
20 According to Article 20(1) of the CCP Act 2007 ‘The President of the Office shall, by 
way of a decision, prohibit the implementation of the concentration, if it results in a significant 
impediment to competition in the market, in particular by the creation or strengthening of 
a dominant position.’
21 According to Article 18 of the CCP 2007 ‘The President of the Office shall, by way of 
decision, issue a consent to implement a concentration, which shall not result in significant 
impediments to competition in the market, in particular, by creation or strengthening of 
a dominant position in the market.’
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will not significantly impede competition in the market, in particular by the 
creation or strengthening of a dominant position22. 
The Polish competition authority also has the power and the obligation 
(especially when the undertaking that files notification of the intent to 
concentrate makes such a request) to approve a concentration as a result of 
which competition in the market will be significantly impeded, in particular 
by the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, in any case when 
there are grounds for not prohibiting the concentration. These include, in 
particular, when (1) the concentration is expected to contribute to economic 
development or technical progress, or (2) it may exert a positive impact on the 
national economy23. Approval of this kind (this means special or exceptional 
approval) is therefore issued in the public interest24. In light of the fact that 
none of the special approval decisions issued to date (and thus this also applies 
to those decisions giving approval for vertical consolidations in the electricity 
sector) has ever undergone review by any judicial body, the nature of this legal 
institution and of the two criteria specified in the Act justifying non-prohibition 
of a concentration is currently a matter of debate25. Indeed, this is a solution 
permitted under EU law as the Commission is restricted in its decision-making 
22 Article 19(1) and (2) of the CCP Act 2007 ‘1. The President of the Office shall, by way of a 
decision, issue a consent to implement a concentration when, upon fulfillment of the conditions 
specified in Paragraph 2 by undertakings intending to implement the concentration, competition 
in the market will not be significantly impeded, in particular by the creation or strengthening 
of a dominant position. 2. The President of the Office may impose upon the undertaking or 
undertakings intending to implement a concentration an obligation, or accept their obligation, 
in particular: 1) to dispose of the entirety or part of the assets of one or several undertakings, 
2) to divest control over an undertaking or undertakings, in particular by disposing of a block of 
stocks or shares, or to dismiss one or several undertakings from the position in the management 
or supervisory board, 3) to grant a competitor exclusive rights – determining in the decision 
referred to in Paragraph 1 the time limit for meeting the requirements.’
23 Article 20(2) of the CCP Act 2007 provides that ‘The President of the Office shall issue, 
by way of a decision, a consent for the implementation of the concentration as a result of 
which competition in the market will be significantly impeded, in particular by the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position, in any case that the desistance from banning concentration 
is justifiable, and in particular: 1) the concentration is expected to contribute to economic 
development or technical progress; 2) it may exert a positive impact on the national economy.’
24 See Article 1(1) of the both CCP Acts 2000 and 2007. 
25 Best reflected in the commentaries on both CCP Acts 2000 and 2007. See: E. Modzelewska-
Wąchal, Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz, Twigger, Warszawa 2-02, 
pp. 172; K. Kohutek [in:] K. Kohutek, M. Sieradzka, Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. 
Komenatrz, LEX a Wolters Kluwer business, Warszawa 2008, pp. 559 ff; Ustawa o ochronie 
konkurencji i konsuemntów. Komentarz. Pod red. C. Banasińskiego i E. Piontka, LexisNexis, 
Warszawa 2009, pp. 372 ff; T. Skoczny [in:] Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsuemntów. 
Komentarz…, pp. 891 ff; A. Stawicki, E. Stawicki, Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. 
Komentarz, LEX a Wolters Kluwer business, Warszawa 2011, pp. 495 ff. 
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power, when appraising concentrations of EU dimension, by the Member 
States’ right to ‘take appropriate measures to protect legitimate interests 
other than those taken into consideration’ by the Merger Regulation26. ’Public 
security’ is considered to be one of these ‘legitimate interests’27. Such ‘public 
security’ certainly includes ‘energy security’28. This does not mean however 
that the solution used in the Polish legislation is correct, and there are many 
reasons for this. This is firstly because it suggests that ‘economic development 
and technical progress’ should not be included in the evaluation of the 
implications of the concentration under the competition test; in the EU (and 
in most EU Member States) ‘development of economic and technical progress’ 
is expressis verbis a criterion which must be taken into account when appraising 
concentrations29. The second reason is that the power to decide not to issue a 
decision prohibiting concentration on the grounds of public interest has been 
conferred on a competition authority and not a political administration body, 
as is the case in other countries. In my view the special approval on the basis 
of the public interest test is a ‘foreign body’ for competition protection by 
an independent competition authority; thus, this instrument should be used 
sparingly and wisely. 
III. Consolidations in the electricity sector between 2000 and 2006 
1.  Approval of concentrations between electricity undertakings 
from 2000 onwards
The processes of reconsolidation in the Polish electricity sector commenced 
just over a decade ago. Due to the scale and value of electricity undertakings 
and heat-energy undertakings (cogenerated electricity) most horizontal and 
vertical concentration in the energy sector had to be notified and evaluated on 
the basis of the Polish merger law. The UOKiK activity reports and online lists 
of decisions (available at the UOKiK website since 2003) reveal that between 
January 2003 and March 200630 the UOKiK President issued 38 unconditional 
26 See Article 21(3) of Regulation 4064/89 and Article 21(4) of Regulation 139/2004.
27 Ibidem.
28 Energy security (‘security of supplies’) is considered to be an indication of ‘public security’ 
also in case law giving the Member State right to restrict free movement of goods within the 
EU; see especially the ECJ judgment of 10 July 1984 in case 72/83 – Campus Oil Limited and 
others v Minister for Industry and Energy and others, ECR 1984, 2727. 
29 Article 2(1)(b) of both Regulation 4064/89 and Regulation 139/2004.
30 I.e. untill the ‘Programme for the Electricity Sector’ was put into place; see below 
footnote 32.
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approvals of concentrations in this sector31. This group also included approvals 
of concentrations in the form of privatizations of electric power stations or 
distribution companies (ZEs), by selling them to foreign firms (for example 
EdF, Electrabel, RWE, Vattenfall), as well as the first national consolidations 
of the distribution companies (ZEs).
As stated above, over the past decade there was a significant rise in the 
pressure for vertical consolidation of the Polish electricity sector within the 
sector itself. This met with a favourable response in government circles 
following the 2005 election. Vertical consolidation in fact became a major 
element of the government’s ‘Programme for the Electricity Sector’ (‘Program 
dla elektroenergetyki’) adopted by the Council of Ministers on March 28, 
2006.32 This Programme involved plans for a vertical consolidation of specific 
undertakings (referred to by name) owned by the State Treasury – i.e., 
generators of electricity (electric power stations), sometimes associated with 
mines that supplied them with coal and with its distributors. The Programme 
was intended to bring about the creation of four powerful energy groups, 
now operating under the commercial names PGE, TAURON, ENERGA and 
ENEA. Approval decisions issued by the UOKiK President were a condition 
for their creation, however.
The creation of the ENERGA group – which took the form of a takeover 
by ENERGA of ‘Koncern Energetyczny ENERGA’ and ‘Zespoł Elektrowni 
Ostrołęka’ – received unconditional approval from the UOKiK President33. 
This was because the authority concluded that the small share in the electricity 
generation market (just over 2%, and sold mainly to the TSO) and the fact 
that ENERGA would continue to have to buy from generators from outside 
its capital group, were not grounds for the conclusion that there would 
be significant impediment to competition in the markets affected by the 
concentration.
Despite the widespread opinion that the vertical consolidations planned by 
the government in the electricity sector would lead to excessive concentration 
of the electricity generation market and impede competition in its wholesale 
distribution market, the UOKiK President gave special approval for:
a) takeover by ‘Polskie Sieci Energetyczne’ (PSE) of control over ‘BOT 
Górnictwo i Energetyka’ (extraction of lignite coal and use of it to 
generate electricity), ‘Zespoł Elektrowni Dolna Odra’ (a major producer 
31 The legal basis for these decisions was Article 17 of the CCP Act 2000.
32 Available at http://www.mg.gov.pl/node/5307. 
33 Decision No DDK – 19/07 of February 16, 2007– ENERGA/KE ENERGA/Zspół Elektrowni 
Ostrołęka; available at www.uokik.gov.pl.
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of electricity from bituminous coal) and 8 ZEs in central and south-east 
Poland (distributing and selling electricity undertakings)34;
b) takeover by ‘Energetyka Południe’ of the – integrated beforehand – ZEs 
of the regions Małopolska and Dolny Śląsk, as well as the electricity 
power stations ‘Elektrownia Stalowa Wola’ and ‘Polski Koncern 
Energetyczny’35;
c) takeover by ENEA of the electricity power station ‘Elektrownia 
Kozienice’36.
At this time the UOKiK President reached the conclusion that these 
consolidations could significantly impede competition but determined that 
there were justified reasons for not prohibiting them.
2. Competition concerns not enabling unconditional approval 
In the view of the UOKiK President these concentrations gave rise to 
competition concerns on particular markets in the electricity sector in Poland 
affected by the concentration horizontally (mainly generation of electricity) 
and/or only vertically (national electricity generation; national electricity 
wholesale market, local electricity retail markets, and local electricity 
distribution markets). 
The largest of the consolidations performed under the government 
‘Programme for the Electricity Sector’ – the creation of the energy group PGE 
– was deemed by the UOKiK President to be a concentration that would lead 
to the creation of a dominant position on the electricity generation market. 
The authority based this view on the market share criterion, which – according 
to sources other than the published version of the decision – would have 
been approximately 40% following the concentration. Due to the fact that 
at the moment of appraisal no undertakings had an electricity generation 
market share that was even close to the market share of the created group, 
and the combined market share of the other three groups created under the 
Programme was approximately 25%, the UOKiK President decided the PGE 
34 Decision No DKK – 163/06 of December 22, 2006 – PSE/10 other entities; available at 
www.uokik.gov.pl. Following the split of PSE Operator (the transmission system operator) from 
PSE SA, on the basis of the assets that remained in PSE SA and assets of the holding company 
BOT, Elektrownia Dolna Odra and the distribution companies described above the PGE Energy 
group was formed. It operates under the commercial name PGE. 
35 Decision No DOK – 29/07 of March 8, 2007 – Energetyka Południe/4 other undertakings; 
available at www.uokik.gov.pl; it operates now under the commercial name TAURON. 
36 Decision No DKK 32/07 of Septemeber 28, 2007 – ENEA/Elektrownia Kozienice; available 
at www.uokik.gov.pl. This decision was then issued on the basis of Article 20(2) of the CCCP 
Act 2007. It still operates under the commercial name ENEA. 
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could operate independently of competitors and of its contracting parties37. 
In the view of the competition authority the concentration in question would 
also lead to the creation of a dominant position on the national generation 
market for electricity from renewable sources and on the national market for 
provision of systemic services, as well as to strengthening a dominant position 
on the national wholesale market38.
In each of these cases of special approval decisions (PGE, ENERGA, 
ENEA)39 the UOKiK President stated clearly that the danger of significant 
impediment to competition through vertical consolidation of generators40 
(in the case of PGE and the TAURON group also having access to lignite 
coal or bituminous coal) and distributors of electricity41 was justified. The 
decision was above all based on the fact that as of the day each was appraised, 
the principle of Third Party Access (TPA)42 was not yet applicable in Poland 
because the majority of electricity users still remained so-called ‘tariff’ users, 
i.e. buyers of electricity from distribution companies to whose networks they 
were connected. In practice vertical relations between electricity generators, 
wholesalers, and retailers create a threat for (a) electricity generators not 
covered by the vertical consolidation; (b) distribution companies not covered 
by the vertical consolidation; (c) undertakings operating on the trading market; 
37 He deemed the quality-related prerequisites for a dominant position (Article 4(9) CCP 
2000) to be fulfilled, stating that the entry to this market of new entities was capital- and time 
consuming and the existing generation capacity was decreasing. These assertions were not 
supported by any evidence, however.
38 Also the reasons for these effects of the concentration were not given in the published 
version of the decision.
39 It should be emphasized that in each of these decisions the wording of the statement of 
reasons is identical. 
40 At this point the UOKiK President cited also the EC standpoint presented in in the 
report on the electricity and gas markets published a little earlier (‘DG Competition report on 
energy sector inquiry’ (SEC(2006)1724, 10 January 2007) pointing clearly to vertical relations 
as a substantial barrier to further liberalization of those markets.
41 It is worth noting the generally negative standpoint of the UOKiK President towards 
vertical concentrations in sectors in which business activity depends on access to infrastructure. 
He prohibited for example the takeover by the dominant producer of crude oil (PKN Orlen) over 
the only Polish marine port through which crude oil is imported to Poland (NAFTOPORT). See 
decision No DDI – 38/2001 of June 29, 2001 – PKN Orlen/ NAFTOPORT (Dziennik Urzędowy 
UOKiK (2001) No 2, item 44).
42 In accordance with the Electricity Directive (Directive 2003/54/EC of ther European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market 
in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC, [2003] L 176/37) and norms laid down in the 
Polish Act of 10 April 1997 – Energy Law (Journal of Laws 1997 No 54, item 348; unified text 
of 2011 available at www.sejm.gov.pl) in Poland as well first the industrial users (from July 1, 
2004) and then households (July 1, 2007) were given the formal option of selection of a supplier.
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and (d) users of electricity connected to a distribution network covered by the 
vertical consolidation.
In the view of the UOKiK President, all of these concentrations constituted 
a threat to the electricity generators not included in the vertical consolidation43 
because those generators could have problems with access to users connected 
to the distribution network of distribution companies covered by the vertical 
consolidation, and thus restricted market access.
It was assumed in the decision that the intended concentrations would 
present a threat to distribution companies not covered by the vertical 
consolidation44 because those distributors could have problems buying 
electricity or buying electricity on non-discriminatory terms. 
The intended concentrations also presented a threat for undertakings 
operating on the trading market because, in the view of the UOKiK President, 
the consolidated groups would try to eliminate those intermediaries in trading 
in electricity. 
The threat for users of electricity connected to the networks of distribution 
companies covered by the vertical consolidation would, in light of those 
decisions, be that they would be forced to buy energy from generators being 
members of the distribution company’s capital group.
In all of these three decisions the UOKiK President did indeed note that 
future amendments to Polish law and EU law might at least partially neutralize 
the significant impediment to competition anticipated at the moment those 
decisions were issued. This included amendments aiming, for example, at 
greater integration of the energy markets within the EU and strengthening 
of the regulatory powers of the energy regulatory authorities (in Poland: 
President of the Energy Regulatory Office), as well as at the envisaged 
ownership structure unbundling of energy network operators. The UOKiK 
President did not however consider it possible to issue unconditional clearance 
for those concentrations45.
43 In these decisions the example given of those generators privatized through sale to foreign 
firms are the electricity power stations ‘Elektrownia Rybnik’ (sold to EdF) and ‘Elektrownia 
Połaniec’ (sold to Electrabel).
44 In these decisions the example given of those distributors privatized through sale to 
foreign firms are ZEs ‘STOEN’ (sold to RWE) i ‘GZE’ (sold to Vattenfall). 
45 These decisions do not show that the UOKiK President even considered using remedies 
as base for conditional clearance.
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3.  Fulfillment of criteria for deciding not to prohibit concentrations 
on the basis of the public interest test
Within the notifications of each of the concentrations discussed above the 
applicants stated that even if the UOKiK President came to the conclusion 
that they might cause significant impediment to competition, there were 
justified grounds for not prohibiting them. This was because the adverse 
implications in the case of these concentrations were outweighed by their 
positive effects, of which some were among the examples given in Article 
19(2) of the CCP Act 2000 or Article 20(2) of the CCP Act 2007. The UOKiK 
President concurred with most of the arguments presented by the applicants 
regarding positive effects of the notified concentrations. His view with regard 
to the creation of the PGE group was that generally that ‘the concentration 
would contribute […] to the ensuring of the country’s energy security and to 
creation of new jobs’46. The special clearance decisions for concentrations 
establishing the TAURON and ENEA groups were based solely on the fact 
that they ‘would support […] the ensuring of Poland’s energy security’47. The 
detailed arguments in support of the potential positive outcomes of those 
concentrations were presented entirely (with respect to the creation of the 
PGE and TAURON groups) or were divided into three sets of criteria: 
‘economic development and technical progress’, ‘impact on the national 
economy’ and ‘other positive outcomes’ (according to Article 20(2) of the 
CCP Act 2007). All those outcomes can be placed in a number of categories, 
contributing – as defined in the ‘Programme for the Energy Sector’ – towards 
ensuring energy security for the country through development and renovation 
of the generation assets and transmission and distribution networks. This will 
enable undertakings and households to be properly supplied with electricity 
in terms of both volume and quality (this includes being in accordance with 
rising environmental protection standards)48.
It can therefore be no surprise that the principal argument for the decision 
by the UOKiK President not to prohibit the notified concentrations was the 
rise in investment potential, resulting above all from the combination of the 
46 Decision approving the creation of PGE Group (see footnote 34).
47 Decisions approving the creation of TAURON and ENEA groups (see footnotes 35 
and 36).
48 Compare the ECJ judgement in case Campus Oil (see above footnote 28), in which the 
Court stated clearly: ‘(…) in light of their special role as a source of energy for the modern 
economy, crude oil products are a key asset for the functioning of a country, particularly as not 
only is the economy dependent on them, but above all the state institutions, its most vital public 
services, and even the physical survival of the civilian population (…)’. See also: Transformacja 
systemu elektroenergetycznego, p. 5–8.
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economic potential of the undertakings being consolidated. ‘The creation of a 
large undertaking should raise its financial standing and credibility as perceived 
by the financial sector’49, due among other things to the strengthening of 
generators (for example ‘BOT’ or ‘Dolna Odra’) who were in debt as a result 
of pro-ecological50 investments initiated during the 1990s. ‘Only undertakings 
with considerably greater capital and cash flow than that demonstrated by the 
undertaking currently existing in the Polish electricity sector would be able 
to handle the necessary generation and network investments’51. However, no 
calculations of the credit rating of the created groups were presented in any 
of the analyzed special clearance decisions.
In the decisions giving special approval for the creation of the TAURON 
and ENEA groups other positive effects of the concentration were also 
described for the undertakings being consolidated, and indirectly for the 
overall national economy. They were seen as arising first and foremost thanks 
to the creation of a undertakings active along the entire energy sector value 
chain (generation, trading, distribution). The most important of these are the 
following:
a) mitigation of risks (mainly in the area of trade in electricity), resulting 
from the expected rise in energy prices, originating from the deficiency 
in electricity production or growing investment and ecological burdens;
b) taking advantage of the scope and dimension (for example with respect 
to negotiation of the conditions for purchasing electricity as well as other 
goods and services);
c) enhancing of a competitive position with respect to the strong – 
predominantly vertically integrated – energy groups operating in EU 
Member States, whose electricity sector structure is typically much more 
concentrated than that of Poland.
The last of these52 could or should have been appraised within the – more 
difficult – economic competition test, and only after that with the – much 
easier – public interest test.
49 Decision approving the creation of ENEA group (see footnote 36).
50 Decision approving the creation of PGE group (see footnote 34).
51 Decision approving the creation of TAURON group (see footnote 35).
52 Along with certain other possible effects of the consolidation of electricity undertakings 
(for example the positive effects on economic development and technical progress) which were 
not however supported by specific economic analyses.
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IV.  The Polish competition authority against further concentrations 
in the electricity sector; the PGE/ENERGA case
In mid 2008, during preparatory work on the ‘Competition Policy for 2008–
2010’53, the UOKiK President drew up a preliminary report on the findings 
of a sector inquiry concerning the condition and prospects for growth of 
competition on the energy market. Following many months of discussions the 
report was finally published in 201054. Among the UOKiK Report’s findings 
are the characteristics of the most vital elements of the electricity sector 
(including its structure, resulting from the government’s 2006 ’Programme for 
the Electricity Sector’55). More over the UOKiK Report reveals the problems 
of further growth of competition in this sector. For instance, it addresses the 
question of further potential changes in the way the sector is structured, as 
well as the problems of liquidity of the wholesale electricity market. In that 
UOKiK Report the authority left no doubt that the UOKiK President would 
oppose further consolidation of the sector, especially enhancement of the PGE 
Group, for example by way of takeover of the ENEA or ENERGA groups. 
According to the UOKiK President consolidation of this kind ‘would mean 
that in practice all electricity could be sold to users connected to distribution 
networks of undertakings being members of the PGE group’56. It should be 
noted at this point that during 2007–2011 the UOKiK President also gave 
unconditional approval for further concentrations that strengthened groups 
competitive to PGE – TAURON57, ENEA58 and ENERGA59.
The UOKiK Report states clearly that for the UOKiK President, even 
in the event that TPA was introduced with respect to all energy users as of 
July 1, 2007, competition in the electricity sector would only be possible if 
53 ‘Polityka konkurencji na lata 2008–2010’. Available at: www.uokik.gov.pl.
54 ‘Kierunki rozwoju konkurencji i ochrony konkurentów w polskim sektorze elektro-
energetycznym (2010)’ [‘Directions of the development of competition and protection of 
consumers in the Polish energy sector (2010)’]. UOKiK, Warszawa 2010; available at: www.
uokik.gov.pl/ (hereafter, UOKiK Report).
55 As a result of this Programme the transmission company PSE Operator (OSP) and the 
4 above-mentioned integrated energy groups PGE, TAURON ENERGA and ENEA groups 
were created.
56 See UOKiK Report, p. 17.
57 Decisions DKK-68/2007 and DKK-69/2007 of December 21, 2007 – Energetyka Południe/
heat power stations of Nowa Sól and Sąbrowa Górnicza; available at www.uokik.gov.pl.
58 Decision No DKK – 15/2008 of February 2, 2008 – ENEA/litigate coal generators Adamów 
and Pątnów; decision No DKK – 59/2011 of May 26, 20011 – ENEA/heat power station Białystok; 
available at www.uokik.gov.pl.
59 Decision No DKK – 7/09 of February 23, 2009 – ENERGA Elektrownie Ostrołęka/ heat 
power station of Ostrołęka; available at www.uokik.gov.pl.
YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
184  TADEUSZ SKOCZNY
there was the ‘appropriate market structure’ (no single or more than one 
vertically integrated producers were in a dominant position), ‘wholesale 
market liquidity’60 and ‘effective separation of trade in energy from energy 
distribution’; the Report itself (as well as subsequent case law) says that the 
UOKiK President saw the ‘assurance of fluidity on the market, guaranteeing 
the appropriate level of energy was in trade’ as playing a special role61. It 
was also announced in the UOKiK Report that the UOKiK President would 
be supporting at least partial privatization both of electricity generators and 
of electricity distributors, of which a large majority were still owned by one 
owner – the State Treasury.
Despite the publication of the UOKiK Report containing the findings of 
energy sector inquiry, the Polish government continued work on changes 
to Poland’s energy policy, including improvement of the capacity to ensure 
Poland’s energy security over the next 10 and 20 years, and instruments for 
putting this into practice. At first the ENEA and ENERGA energy groups 
were intended to be privatized. Privatization of the ENEA group has been 
underway – with intervals – since 2010; one of the large vertically-integrated 
energy groups (for example EdF) will probably be its buyer. Due to the fact 
that the highest bid for the ENERGA group came from the PGE group – also 
state-controlled – the ‘Energy Policy of Poland until 2030’62 was amended63 
and the government decided to continue with concentrations by allowing PGE 
to take over ENERGA by way of the market sale by the Minister for the 
State Treasury of shares amounting to 84.19% of ENERGA’s capital. The 
fundamental reasons the government and the parties to that transaction gave 
for the concentration were as follows: the need to respond to the challenge 
presented by the progressive regionalization of the energy markets; the need 
for the PGE and ENERGA groups to go along with the government’s energy 
policy; the need to carry out development and rejuvenation investments and 
the resulting need to ensure a stable market profile of the PGE and ENERGA 
groups; the potential for making use of the unique synergy between the PGE 
60 The term ‘fluid’ is sometimes used in EU law for meaning ‘liquidity’. For instance in the 
opinion of the Economic and Social Committee in which it is declared: ‘The EU will certainly 
gain from being able to count on a wholesale electricity and gas market which is fluid, orderly 
and functional and above all protected from manipulation.’ See: ‘Opinion of the European 
Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on energy market integrity and transparency’ COM (2010) 726 Final, OJ 
[2011] C 132/21, pont 3.1.
61 See UOKiK Report, p. 22 ff.
62 See Resolution No 202/2009 of the Council of Ministers; available at:http://www.mg.gov.
pl/Gospodarka/Energetyka/Polityka+energetyczna.
63 See Resolution No 157/2010 of the Council of Ministers amending the Resolution No 
202/2009 (upublished).
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and ENERGA groups. The government’s expectation was that the UOKiK 
President would give clearance for the transaction according to rules similar 
to those applied with respect to the past consolidations of the Polish electricity 
sector.
Meanwhile, as of early 2011, the UOKiK President prohibited a takeover of 
ENERGA by PGE64, because the proceedings led the competition authority 
to the conclusion that the concentration ‘would however lead to a significant 
impediment to competition’ on two national markets. Firstly, it would lead 
to a ‘significant impediment to competition on the national electricity retail 
market’. Secondly ‘the vertical relations that existed between the players on 
the national wholesale electricity market and the national retail electricity 
market would lead to significant impediment of competition’. By the same 
token the UOKiK President could not approve the transaction under Article 
18(1) of the CCP Act 2007.
In the published statement of reasons for the decision in the PGE/
ENERGA case the UOKiK President analyzed the option of not prohibiting 
that concentration on the basis of the prerequisites described in Article 20(2) 
of the CCP Act. 2007. The competition authority did not concur however with 
the standpoint adopted by the applicants – namely, that the concentration 
would also contribute to ‘economic development and technical progress’ and 
give rise to direct benefits for customers, as well as help to bring about greater 
energy security for Poland.
The UOKiK President also decided not to impose conditions on the 
applicants, since this would have made it possible to issue conditional clearance 
under Article 19 of the CCP Act 2007, as ‘it was not possible to apply any 
conditions whatsoever that could be deemed appropriate’.
The applicants contested the decision prohibiting the PGE/ENERGA 
concentration; they appealed against the prohibition to the SOKiK. The 
SOKiK has the power to amend it and give approval or to annul it if it finds 
that the degree of error in observance of principles of procedural justice in 
the proceedings pertaining to the concentration means that the implications 
for competition might have been appraised wrongly65.
64 Decision No DKK – 1/2011 of January 13, 2011 – PGE/ENERGA; available at: www.
uokik.gov.pl.
65 This is not an issue addressed in this article, however.
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V.  Factors that need to be taken into account when appraising 
concentrations in the electricity sector under merger law in Poland
1. The market structure 
To put it very simply, evaluation of any concentration of which a competition 
authority receives notification comprises two kinds of factors: the market 
structure and functional factors. The less the anti-competitive nature of the 
concentration is determined by the market structure, the more important it 
becomes to account for functional factors. However, even in this case threats to 
competition can be eliminated by applying remedies of a structural nature. In 
any case the potential competition (new entries), the strength of the demand 
(purchase power) side and the so-called efficiency gains can take prevalence 
over the anti-competitive structural consequences.
Looking at the matter from a historical point of view the structure of the 
market was the sole or fundamental criterion for appraisal of concentrations, 
especially on the basis of the Harvard School. Despite the fact that in the US 
and in the EU the fundamental grounds for economic theory of competition 
are today formed by the Chicago or NeoChicago School66 (mostly concerning 
understanding of effective competition, market power and the relevant 
market67), the market structure criterion still plays a major role in the process 
of appraisal of intended concentrations, especially – but not only – horizontal 
concentrations. In the EU this has been confirmed in guidelines for evaluation 
of horizontal and non-horizontal concentrations68. In Poland this can be 
seen by the entire decision-making policy adopted up to now by the UOKiK 
President, based particularly strongly on the statutory presumption that 
a dominant position exists at 40%. This continued to be the prevalent practice 
even after May 1, 2004 (when Poland joined the EU), since when, as a result 
of the statutory change to the competition test for appraising concentrations, 
the structural criterion for market dominance has now been rendered merely 
66 See for instance G. Monti, EC Competition Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambrige 
2007, p. 53–88.
67 See: S. Bishop, M. Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application 
and Measurement, University Edition, Sweet & Maxwell 2010. Part I. Concepts; A. Lindsay, 
The EC Merger Regulation: Substantive Issues. Second edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2006, 
passim; U. Schwalbe, D. Zimmer, Law and Economics in European Merger Control, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2009, part I.
68 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on 
the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ [2004] C 31/5, p. 21; Guidelines on 
the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings, OJ [2008] C 265/7.
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an example test of ‘significant impediment to competition’ which if proven can 
lead to a concentration being prohibited unless the criteria for conditional or 
special approval have been met.
Unilateral effects of a concentration with respect to market structure prior 
to and post concentration may be analyzed using three measures: the number 
of market players, market share and degree of concentration69.
The UOKiK President has never raised the argument of the number of 
market players in any of the past unconditional or special approval decisions 
issued. The first time the competition authority decided to do this was in the 
decision prohibiting the PGE/ENERGA concentration. The UOKiK President 
deemed the reduction of the number of market players on the retail market – 
from 4 to 3 – when there are approximately 30 active players on that market 
selling electricity to end users – to be an important (but of course not the 
only) factor indicating a ‘significant impediment to competition’. Meanwhile 
the reduction of the number of market players cannot by itself be considered 
sufficient evidence of a ‘significant impediment to competition’, but a great 
deal of importance is attached to the shares of the parties to the concentration 
in relevant markets prior to and post the concentration. It is difficult to dispute 
this standpoint when the post-concentration market share exceeds 50%, and 
especially 70–80%70; and this is also practice of the European Commission. 
A critical view must be taken of this standpoint when the ascertained 
market shares following the concentration, which were the main grounds for 
prohibiting it, fluctuate around 40% (the level of the rebuttable presumption 
defined in Article 4(8) of the CCP Act 2000 and Article 4(9) of the CCP Act 
2007). In the analyzed decisions regarding electricity sector concentrations it 
was only in the case of decisions giving special approval for creation of the 
PGE group that it was confirmed to be anti-competitive in nature. One of the 
reasons for this was that this concentration would give PGE a total share in the 
generation market of approximately 40%, which – in the view of the UOKiK 
President – would lead to a creation of a dominant position on this market.
It needs to be stressed that, although the market share in the electricity 
generation markets would rise to approximately 42% following the PGE/
ENERGA concentration, the UOKiK President did not find ‘strengthening 
of a dominant position’ and neither did the authority deem that market 
share to be sufficient to conclude that there was ‘significant impediment to 
competition’. Perhaps this is a symptom of the thinking that even the national 
leaders have the right (and even the obligation towards their stockholders) 
69 Ibidem. For more see: S. Bishop, M. Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law…, 
s. 366 ff; A. Lindsay, The EC Merger Regulation…, s. 268 ff; U. Schwalbe, D. Zimmer, Law and 
Economics in European Merger Control…, p. 175 ff.
70 As in case 85/76 Hoffman La Roche v. EC Commission, ECR 1997, 461.
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to expand and increase their market share even up to the level of a dominant 
market position; the issue is only that they may not abuse a dominant position.
The criterion for the market share was however highly relevant to the 
determining of a ‘strong market position’ (and not market ‘dominant position’) 
of the undertaking to be created following the takeover of the ENERGA 
group by PGE. The total share in the retail electricity market of the PGE/
ENERGA group would be slightly above 40%, while the market shares of the 
two remaining key players on this market (TAURON and ENEA) would be 
comparable (ca 42–43%)71. 
The level of concentration on the markets on which further consolidations 
are to be carried out is measured in the traditional way using the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) and its change (Delta indicator) directly brought 
about by the intended concentration. These indicators are well-known and 
applied in concentration proceedings in Poland. However, they were applied 
neither in any of the discussed special approvals nor in the decision prohibiting 
the PGE/ENERGA concentration. If the HHI had been calculated during 
these proceedings it would have demonstrated a high level of concentration 
of many of the electricity markets affected by this concentration. 
Also the indicator C3 and C5 were not examined in the proceedings 
described in this article.
The low number of market players, the significant market shares (for 
example at the level of the rebuttable presumption of a dominant position) 
as well as the high level of concentration, do not however necessarily exclude 
efficient functioning of the market under conditions of effective competition. 
This seems to be the predominant view of the modern competition economy. 
All of these factors only constitute the ‘an initial indicator of the absence of 
competition concerns. However, they do not give rise to a presumption of 
either the existence or the absence of such concerns’72. This is because they 
only show the structural ‘macro’ relations of markets. Only consideration of 
the issue at ‘micro’ level – of the competitive position of specific undertakings 
offering specific groups of products – demonstrates the proper level of ‘market 
power’ (or ‘increased market power’). In order to show the true picture of the 
market structure the following questions also need to be asked, in the view of 
S. Bishop and M. Walker: ‘are some firms closer competitors to one another?; 
are rival firms able to expand in response to any putative price increase?; can 
rival firms alter their product offerings?; can new firms enter the market in 
71 Approximeted on dates available at www.ure.gov.pl/portal/pl/424/3553/Przedstawiamy_
informacje_dotyczace_charakterystyki_krajowego_rynku_energii_elekt.html and www.cire.pl/
rynekenergii/podstawa.php?smid=207#dostarczanie.
72 ‘Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers…’, point 21.
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response to any post-merger price increase?; what actions can consumers take 
to undermine any attempt to increase prices post-merger?’73
The reducing of the analysis of the effects of the concentration to a 
calculation of market shares following the concentration is a sign of belief in 
the traditional (and today highly criticized) Harvard School and its paradigm 
“structure-conduct-performance” (SCP). Nowadays there is a definite swing 
towards the view that a ‘high level of concentration does not necessarily mean 
that markets cannot function effectively’74. The reduction in the number of 
basic electricity suppliers on the market, for example from 4 to 3 in the case 
of the PGE/ENERGA merger, cannot therefore be considered to be sufficient 
evidence of ‘a significant impediment to competition’. 
Basing the evaluation of the concentrations (for instance, concentrations 
in the electricity sector) almost solely on the indicators that give a picture 
of the market structure means that they are appraised above all from the 
point of view of whether they give rise to unilateral effects75. According to 
economic competition theory such effects arise when an undertaking ‘has 
the ability to increase price or reduce quality to the detriment of consumers 
despite the responses of the remaining competitors’76; in other words if the 
concentration gives rise to increased market power, which is the ‘ability of one 
or more firms to profitably increase prices, reduce output, choice or quality 
of goods or services, diminish innovation, or otherwise influence parameters 
of competition’77. At the core of every decision prohibiting a concentration 
of which anti-competitive coordinated effects do not constitute an essential 
aspect, there should therefore be the assertion that the ‘mostly liked’78 result 
is the creation or strengthening of a dominant position on any of the defined 
relevant markets.
Meanwhile since May 1, 2004 the UOKiK President has rarely presented 
evidence of the ‘creation or strengthening of a dominant position’ as a result 
of the concentration being evaluated. The modification of the test, carried out 
after all to determine the anti-competitive coordinated effects of concentrations 
73 S. Bishop, M. Walker, The Economics of EC Competititon Law..,, p. 364.
74 Ibidem, p. 366.
75 The Polish antitrust authority did not look at the coordinated effects in any of the 
decisions issued cases regarding concentrations on the energy markets and for this reason 
these issues cannot be addressed at all in this article.
76 S. Bishop, M. Walker, The Economics of EC Competititon Law…, p. 350. 
77 ‘Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers…’, point 8. 
78 More for the standard of proof in concentration cases see in my case comment on the EJC 
judgement in case C-413/06 P Bertelsmann/Sony v. European Commission: T. Skoczny, ‘Bertelsmann 
AG i Sony Corporation of America przeciwko Komisji Wspólnot Europejskich’ [w:] Orzecznictwo 
sądów wspólnotowych w sprawach konkurencji w latach 2004–2009, Oficyna a Wolters Kluwer 
company, Warszawa 2010, p. 126 ff, as well as the European literature cited therein.
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on oligopolistic markets79, is treated by the Polish competition authority as 
an opportunity to prohibit concentrations that do not create or strengthen a 
dominant position, and only enlarge a market share. I do not see any reason 
why derogation from the requirement to produce evidence that a dominant 
position is created or strengthened would help to lower the evidentiary threshold 
in the case of concentrations giving rise only to unilateral effects, i.e., its two 
substantive prerequisites – of either statutory80 or case law81 origin: (a) the 
ability to ‘prevent effective competition within a relevant market’ and (b) the 
capacity ‘to act in a significant degree independently of competitors, contracting 
parties and consumers’. If the market share can indicate the ‘ability to prevent 
effective competition’, then this does not in any way determine the ‘capacity to 
act in a significant degree independently of competitors, contracting parties and 
consumers’. Nor in the case of the prohibited PGE/ENERGA concentration 
did the UOKiK President find a dominant position to have been created post 
concentration. The competition authority only found an increase in market share, 
albeit balanced by the market shares of main competitors. Also, the level of 
concentration in the Polish electricity sector is lower than in other EU Member 
States on the generation markets82 or moderate on the wholesale markets.
2.  Other factors indicating whether or not there is a threat 
of ‘significant impediment of competition’
While limiting the discussion to unilateral effects of intended concentrations, 
one may say that the structural consequences of each concentration (creation 
or strengthening of a dominant position or at least a strong market position) 
can be always corroborated or countervailed mainly by the following three 
79 See: S. Bishop, M. Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law…, s. 390 ff; A. Lindsay, 
The EC Merger Regulation, s. 294 ff; U. Schwalbe, D. Zimmer, Law and Economics in European 
Merger Control…, p. 221 ff. 
80 According to Article 4(10) of the CCP 2007 ‘a ‘dominant position’ shall mean a position 
of the undertaking which allows it to prevent the efficient competition within a relevant market 
thus enabling it to act in a significant degree independently of competitors, contracting parties 
and consumers; it is assumed that undertaking holds a dominant position if its market share 
exceeds 40%’. 
81 See ECJ judgements in cases 27/76 United Brands v. EC Commission, ECR 1978, 207 or 
85/76 Hoffman La Roche v. EC Commission, ECR 1997, 461.
82 According to Technical Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament. Report on Progress in creating the internal gas and 
electricity markets of 11 March 2010;. SEC (2010)251 Final; see also Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Report on Progress in creating the 
internal gas and electricity markets of 11 March 2009. SEC (2009)115 Final; Transformacja 
systemu elektroenergetycznego, p. 12. 
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factors: potential competition, purchasing power and efficiency gains83. In the 
unconditional and special approval decisions analyzed above, issued for the 
notified concentration between electricity undertakings, those factors were 
not, unfortunately, considered – and if so only to a small degree (efficiency 
gains for example under the public interest test). 
A fundamental element of the evaluation of the consequences of the 
intended concentrations by the competition authorities is or should be the 
possibility of new entries to given markets (potential competition)84. Where 
there is that possibility, even large market shares do not bring market power. 
Where there is no such possibility or there are severe barriers to market 
access, an undertaking can have market power even with low market shares. 
In decisions giving special approval for creation of the PGE, TAURON 
and ENERGA groups this argument appeared only in reference to the 
European Commission’s Report giving the findings of the inquiry into the 
internal electricity and gas markets, and which identified vertical relations 
as a substantial barrier to further liberalization of these markets85. In Polish 
conditions the UOKiK President therefore already concluded at that point 
that to the extent, if at all, that the share in the electricity generation market 
and share in the retail electricity market were similar, the consolidated energy 
groups were not interested in entry of new market players to the market.
In the decision prohibiting the PGE/ENERGA concentration the UOKiK 
President stated only that ‘entry into the electricity generation market by new 
parties was limited by substantial barriers (capital- and time-consuming – 
investments in production capacity require relatively high investment outlays, 
and the construction takes a long time)’. The authority deemed however 
only the historical argument to be evidence for this assertion, this historical 
argument being that recent entries by new undertakings to the electricity 
generation market amounted as a rule to takeover of Polish energy generators 
or distributors by foreign firms (EdF, Electrabel, Vattenfall, RWE). The 
UOKiK President did not however provide a detailed analysis of availability 
of capital loans or the potential for building generation capacity in short 
investment technologies, which could have undermined those arguments.
It is typical that the UOKiK President only conducted discussions 
surrounding potential competition (new entries to the market) when defining 
83 Inaczej niż Komisja Europejska in ‘Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers…’, 
points 89–91, I see that ‘failing company defence’ serves more as ‘absolute defence’ than factors 
corroborating or countervailing results of SIEC analyses.
84 See: ‘Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers…’, points 68–75; S. Bishop, 
M. Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law…, s. 384 ff; A. Lindsay, The EC Merger 
Regulation, s. 480 ff.
85 ‘DG Competition report on energy sector inquiry’ (SEC(2006)1724, 10 January 2007.
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the geographical dimension of the relevant markets (above all the generation 
and the wholesale market). It is difficult to contest the classification of those 
markets as national markets due to the currently negligible level of import 
of electricity to Poland (2–3%) and the low level of transmission capacity on 
cross-border connections in the direction of import. The evaluation of the 
intended concentrations differs from assessment, for example, of abuse of a 
dominant position in that it is prognostic and probabilistic in nature. While 
modification (extension) of the definition of a market does in fact require 
a major change to the above-described levels of import and cross-border 
transmission capacity, even a small increase in these could have a positive 
effect in terms of competition on the behaviour of the undertakings that hold 
the strongest position on the electricity retail market. If this were not the 
case the Commission would not be so determined in its efforts to bring about 
liberalization of the electricity and gas markets, including through imposing 
structural modification remedies on vertically integrated energy enterprises 
in the form of commitment decisions issued on the basis of Article 9 of 
Regulation 1/200386. 
The UOKiK President did not examine the impact the position of the 
contracting parties87 would have on the market position of those groups in any 
of the decisions giving special clearance for the creation of the PGE, TAURON 
and ENERGA groups. These contracting parties include in particular industrial 
(commercial) electricity users (buyers) who, since July 1, 2004, had the TPA to 
the network. In all of those decisions the UOKiK President stated only that the 
phenomenon of change of supplier was still negligible in Poland, due among 
other things to the barriers existing in this respect, or even the lack of awareness 
among electricity users that such a change can be made. 
This argument was in essence repeated in the decision prohibiting the PGE/
ENERGA concentration. Although the so-called migrations are increasing 
year by year – to a significant extent in the case of industrial users and slightly 
in the case of households – the UOKiK President did not acknowledge this as 
being an argument favouring growing pressure of demand. 
86 See: U. Scholz, S. Purps, ‘The Application of EC Competititon Law in the Energy Sector’, 
[2010] 1(1) Journal of European Competition Law & Pratice, p. 37 ff.; J. Ruiz Calzado, R. Motta, M. 
E Leoz Martin-Casallo, ‘The European Commission’s Recent Activity in the Electricity and Gas 
Sectors: Integrated Approach, Pragmatism and Guidance in EU Competititon Enforcement’, The 
European Antitrust Review, GCR 2011, p. 90 ff; K. Kloc-Evson, D. Kośka, ‘Kontrola koncnetracji + 
regulacja = LIBERALIZACJA. Kontrola koncentracji na tle reform regulacyjnych w europejskim 
sektorze energetycznym’ [in:] Prawo i ekonomia konkurencji. Wybrane zagadnienia. Redakcja B. 
Kurcz, LEXa Wolters Kluwer business, Warszawa 2010, p. 457 ff. 
87 See: ‘Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers…’, points 68–75; S. Bishop, 
M. Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law…, s. 388 ff; A. Lindsay, The EC Merger 
Regulation, s. 467 ff.
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It is typical that in all of the decisions granting special approval also the 
efficiency gains88, if any, were not analyzed until the stage of examination 
of the grounds for not prohibiting under Article 19(2) CCP of the Act 2000 
or Article 20(2) of the CCP Act 2007. It is difficult to say, but it also cannot 
be ruled out, that if that analysis had been carried out during the basic 
competition test analysis stage, significant impediment to competition would 
not have been found – at least in the case of creation of the TAURON and 
ENERGA groups. 
With respect to the decision prohibiting the takeover by PGE of the 
ENERGA group as well, the applicants pointed out the numerous efficiency 
gains. The UOKiK President concluded however that at best they were gains 
for the parties to the concentration, and did not translate into benefits for the 
public and the economy at large, and that therefore there were no grounds 
for justifying not prohibiting the concentration. Neither in this scope was the 
issue supported by specific and detailed economic evidence. 
VI. Conclusions
The discussion of the issues presented above shows that the scale of threats 
to competition that might arise due to the vertical reconsolidation of the Polish 
electricity sector that occurred in 2006–2007 in the form of the creation of four 
vertically integrated energy groups was not great. Furthermore, the question 
shall be left unresolved as to whether allowing their creation under the Polish 
competition protection law (especially merger law) – in three instances, and 
particular in the case of the TAURON and ENEA groups – required special 
approvals, or whether that could have been achieved due to unconditional 
approval or – in the case of the PGE group – conditional approval from 
the UOKiK President. This is probably not the case but applying the legal 
institution of special approval for evaluating those transactions was relatively 
easy, and in any case easier than issuance of unconditional or conditional 
approval. There are many reasons for this. First, in none of these cases did 
the UOKiK President take a great regulatory risk even at the stage at which it 
was established that those consolidations were a potential source of ‘significant 
impediment to competition’. This is because the competition authority 
concluded that unilateral structural effects of those consolidations (a lower 
88 See: ‘Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers…’, points 68–75; S. Bishop, 
M. Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law…, s. 412 ff; A. Lindsay, The EC Merger 
Regulation, s. 510 ff; U. Schwalbe, D. Zimmer, Law and Economics in European Merger 
Control…, p. 318 ff.
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number of market players, increase in the market shares to the level in the 
range of the presumed market dominance) were enough for the competition 
test to be proved. Second – as in the case of all of the decisions issuing 
clearance – in the end the intended consolidations could have been performed 
within the scope of implementing government policy (contribution to ensuring 
the country’s energy security) and meeting the economic expectations of the 
players themselves (a rise in the value of their businesses and their investment 
capability). Third, under the Polish merger law it was also evident that, being 
positive decision, special approval is not contested by applicants and is not 
subject to judicial review. It can be of no surprise therefore that none of 
these decisions contains detailed economic analyses confirming both ‘a rise 
in investment capability’ and other efficiencies. 
This is all the more reason why it is surprising that in the case of the 
PGE/ENERGA concentration the UOKiK President decided to prohibit the 
transaction. That consolidation does not give rise to a substantial shift in the 
balance of market power, apart from the fact that indeed the number of major 
players on the electricity production and marketing markets will go down 
from 4 to 3. Even if it was acknowledged that in this case as well the scale of 
potential competition, purchasing power and – in particular – efficiency gains, 
which should be analyzed during the stage of analysis of fulfillment of the 
competition test, does not completely eliminate the threats to competition, 
there is no doubt that proving the fulfillment of the public interest test 
(ensuring the country’s energy security) should be even easier today than it 
was in 2006–2007. In any case the need for investment in generation capacity 
and electricity networks is of course now greater, which fact cannot be without 
relevance when evaluating the ‘rise in investment capability’ argument, which 
was the decisive factor in the issuance of special approvals for the creation 
of the PGE, TAURON and ENEA groups. The rejection of that argument, 
without carrying out detailed economic analyses to determine whether it is 
correct, could be considered a violation of Article 20(2) of the CCP Act 2007 
due to failure to account for arguments relating to government energy policy. 
From the formal point of view the UOKiK President has the independent 
power to decide to prohibit a concentration or – but only in exceptional cases 
– to decide not to prohibit a concentration if he believes that there are justified 
grounds as defined in Article 20(2) of the CCP Act 2007. He cannot however 
simply reject government energy policy arguments because – precisely due to 
his decision-making autonomy with regard to competition issues – the UOKiK 
President is not a political administration authority89. The burden of proof of 
fulfillment of the prerequisites of those provisions is on the applicants, who 
89 See Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz pod redakcją C. 
Banasińskiego, E. Piontka, p. 489.
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have the right to expect that as they are implementing the energy policy of the 
state – acting as a political authority and owner – the arguments pointing out 
that further consolidation is needed in the electricity sector will be considered 
properly. By refusing not to prohibit the concentration, the UOKiK President 
questioned the instruments of implementation of energy policy, and only the 
government has the authority to select those. 
Although it sounds demagogic, the statement made by the UOKiK President, 
that adoption of that stance could lead the applicants to rightly expect further 
potential consolidations of the existing energy groups, and that the UOKiK 
President should also give special clearance for those consolidations, is certainly 
not far from the truth. With the exception of the conditions existing due to 
EU law, as long as the public authorities with a democratic mandate, and 
therefore also accountable to the electorate (who are the final consumers of 
electricity) retain ownership control over the undertakings that are important 
for its national energy security policy, they should have the power to decide 
what position those undertakings have within the national energy market 
structure. The government can in principle only dispose of that power when it 
disposes of ownership control over those undertakings by way of privatization. 
It will then be possible to apply the rules for protection of competition without 
hindrance for the purpose of preventing further (excessive) concentration or 
abuse of market power.
The examples of experiences and problems presented above, relating 
to competition (merger) law assessment of vertical reconsolidation of the 
electricity sector in Poland, require that the issue again be raised of whether 
the solution that presently exists under Polish merger law (which affords 
the UOKiK President twofold authority to appraise concentrations which 
indeed might represent a threat to competition, but bring with them gains 
for the economy and public at large) is a legitimate once90. Poland is among 
the few countries in which the competition authority is forced to apply the 
public interest test in concentration cases. It is true that there are countries in 
which concentrations that do not pass the competition test are allowed on the 
basis of the public interest test. In these countries however it is the political 
administration authorities (the government, ministers) that have power to 
issue special approval of this kind. In order to mitigate the risk that could 
arise due to overly frequent and easy exercising of those powers, in some of 
those countries the relevant institutional and procedural safeguards have been 
put in place.
90 For more see: A. Stawicki, E. Stawicki, Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. 
Komentarz…, pp. 500 ff; T. Skoczny [in:] Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsuemntów. 
Komentarz, p. 900 ff.
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Among the countries that use not only the competition test but also the public 
interest test to evaluate a concentration are such EU countries as Belgium, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom – as well as non-EU countries such as 
Switzerland and Ukraine91. In all of those countries, the national competition 
authorities make concentration decisions on the basis of the competition test. 
In Belgium the Competition Council has to present a decision prohibiting 
a concentration to the government, which can issue clearance within 30 days 
of the date on which it is delivered to the parties if the public good (public 
security, competitiveness in that sector, consumer interests, the labour market) 
takes priority over the damage done by the detrimental effect on competition. 
The Federal Minister for Commerce can also grant special approval for 
a concentration prohibited by the Federal Cartel Authority, while prior to 
issuing that decision it is required to seek the opinion of the Monopolies 
Commission (Monopolkommission). In the United Kingdom there are three 
categories of public interest cases (general, special and ‘legitimate interest’) 
which involved the Secretary of State being in charge for business. They have 
in common, first, the issuing of a notice by the Secretary of State. The effect of 
such a notice is to require the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) to investigate the 
merger and provide a report. After receiving a report from the OFT a reference 
may be made by the Secretary of State to the Competition Commission (CC). 
If the CC decides that the merger is against the public interest, it must then 
answer questions relating to remedies. Upon receipt of the CC’s report, the 
Secretary of State has 30 working days in which to make a decision on the 
questions CC tabled. However, the Secretary of State is not bound by the CC’s 
views on the public interest test92. The Swiss government (Federal Council) 
also has the power to give ‘special authorization’ for a concentration if it will 
have a positive impact on the market. Finally, the Council of Ministers in 
Ukraine has the power to grant clearance for a concentration prohibited by 
the Ukrainian Antimonopoly Commission if the parties to the concentration 
manage to demonstrate the positive outcomes of the concentration for the 
public interest, and this outweighs the adverse effects of the concentration for 
competition (1st condition) and will not present a danger to existence of the 
market economy in Ukraine (2nd condition).
91 See national chapters in Internationale Comparative Legal Guide to ‘Enforcement of 
Competititon Law 2009’ available at www.iclg.co.uk and in Rowley & Baker, International 
mergers… For more in Polish see T. Skoczny, ‘Instytucjonalne modele wdrażania reuł konkurencji 
na świecie – wnioski dla Polski’, (2011) 73(2) Ruch Prawniczy Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny, 
p. 77 ff.
92 See also Merger Assessment Guidelines. A joint publication of the Commpetition 
Commission and Office of Fair Trading. September 2010; available at www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/
mergers/publications/substantive/, p. 65 ff. 
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Incidentally, the Polish competition authority seems to prefer to counter 
threats to competition caused by concentrations by way of prohibition, and 
not conditional approval. Since 2000 the UOKiK President in fact issued 5 
decisions prohibiting concentrations and 9 decisions granting conditional 
approval (a ratio of 1 to 2)93. As we see the European Commission and many 
competition authorities in EU Member States have different understandings 
of their mission to protect competition, prefering to issue decisions giving 
conditional approvals on the basis of which the applicants undertake or are 
obliged to undertake the remedies which, on the one hand, are intended to 
eliminate in an effective way the threat to competition, and on the other hand 
allow applicants to achieve acceptable commercial goals. The ratio of decisions 
prohibiting concentrations to decisions granting conditional clearance in the 
Commission’s practice is 1 to 1094.
In none of the decisions concerning consolidations in the energy sector in 
2006–2007 did the UOKiK President even consider the option of conditional 
approval. The competition authority did do this however in a decision 
prohibiting the takeover by PGE over the ENERGA group. In that case 
the UOKiK President acknowledged that there were no remedies that could 
eliminate the competition concerns presented by that concentration (mainly 
those that were the result of vertical integration). The reasons for this decision 
were based however on speculative statements and not on specific economic 
evidence. 
It is typical that the negative stances cited in the decision (for example lack 
of liquidity and transparency of wholesale market) taken with respect to the 
concentration by influential competitors – market players that were strong 
not only in Poland (for example RWE, E.ON or CEZ) – demonstrated that in 
order to amend them ‘mechanisms for releasing energy in groups through sale 
of energy in a competitive manner have to be imposed’ or ‘through making 
an undertaking that guarantees that liquidity and transparency of the Polish 
energy trading market will not deteriorate as a result of the concentration’. 
This commitments made by PGE/ENERGA ‘could infer that a specified 
percentage of electricity it generated would be sold to a platform that was 
publicly accessible and free from discrimination’. E.ON believes that ‘this 
undertaking should apply (including the already existing statutory obligation) 
to approximately 15–20 TWh of electricity per year’. According to the CEZ 
Trade’s opinion ‘PGE should be ordered to sell all electricity... on the stock 
exchange… in a competitive and equal manner’. Organizations representing 
93 For more see T. Skoczny, ‘Polskie prawo kontroli koncnetracji – ewolucja, model, wybrane 
problemy’, (2010) 5 Europejski Przegląd Sądowy, p. 15.
94 See statistics of the EU merger cases available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
mergers/statistics.pdf.
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users of electricity also opposed the only ‘unconditional takeover of the 
market’, suggesting that any potential consent ’could only be granted on a 
conditional basis’, for example ‘by imposing specific obligations on the new 
entity’. The UOKiK President did not address these ‘proposals’ in any way in 
his prohibition decision. 
In my view a modifying behavioral condition (remedy) could and should 
be applied in this case. The commitment of the PGE group to ensure that for 
the next 10 years, i.e. 5 years longer than provided for in Article 49a(2) of the 
Act of 10 April 1997 – Energy Law (Energy Law)95, energy generators in the 
PGE group will sell all of their energy in accordance with Article 49a(2) of 
the Energy Law, i.e. through the commodities market, the regulated market 
and online trading platforms on the regulated market96, would be sufficient 
and effective and easy to monitor97. This remedy could ensure public and 
equal access to that energy, a transparent role of PGE in electricity trading, 
and successful elimination of the threats to competition mentioned in the 
decision – threats caused by lack of market transparency. Of course that would 
mean specific economic evidence would have to be produced to prove that this 
assumption was correct. Morover, the effective conditions would have to be 
put in place to guarantee that PGE complied with the imposed modification 
conditions (for example appointing – for the first time in Poland – a so-called 
monitoring trustee). 
In the context of the PGE/ENERGA concentration it can also be seen 
clearly that there would also be a great need in Poland for a formal two-
stage control procedure98. The current procedural legislation in fact renders 
impossible a discussion between the applicants and the competition authority 
regarding the true merits of the case, as they do not place on the latter an 
obligation to present competition concerns during the proceedings that should 
be the basis for a proposal for conditions put forward by the parties to the 
95 Unified text available at www.ure.gov.pl/portal/pl/25/17/Ustawa_z_dnia_10_kwietnia
_1997_r__Prawo_energetyczne.html.
96 PGE’s argumentation, at the core of the appeal against the decision prohibiting the 
PGE/ENERGA concentration seems to be going in this direction. See ‘Komentarz PGE 
do stanowisk i obaw UOKiK’ [‘PGE Commentary to UOKiK stance and fears’] available 
at websites: http://www.pgesa.pl/pl/PGE/CentrumPrasowe/InformacjePrasowe/Strony/
KomentarzPGEdoobawistanowiskaUOKiK.aspx; http://www.pgesa.pl/pl/PGE/CentrumPrasowe/
InformacjePrasowe/Documents/Prezentacja%20odwołanie%20UOKiK.pdf.
97 This means it would fulfill prerequisities defined in Commission Notice on remedies 
acceptable under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and under Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 802/2004, OJ [2008] C 267/1/.
98 There is a two-stage control proceedings in concentration cases in the EU (see Council 
Regulation 139/2004) and a substantial number of its Member States.
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concentration99. Fortunately, the introduction of such a two-stage procedure 
in concentration cases has been announced lately in the Polish ‘Competition 
Policy for 2011–2013’100. 
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